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Abstract 
This paper examines a distinctive mechanism of providing incentives to local 
governments – upgrading counties to "cities". In China, awarding city status to 
existing counties is the dominant way of creating new urban administrative units, 
during which the local government gets many benefits. Using a large panel data set 
covering all counties in China during 1993-2004, I investigate the determinants of 
upgrading. I find that the official minimum requirements for upgrading are not 
enforced in practice. Instead, economic growth rate plays a key role in obtaining city 
status. An empirical test is then conducted to distinguish between a principal-agent 
incentive mechanism and political bargaining. The findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the central government uses upgrading to reward local officials for 
high growth, as well as aligning local interests with those of the center. This paper 
highlights the importance of both fiscal and political incentives facing the local 
government. The comparison between incentive mechanism and bargaining sheds 
light on an important question about China’s politics of governance: where does 
power lie in China? 
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1. Introduction 
In transition and developing countries, a major concern of the central government is 
to give local governments incentives to spur market development and economic growth. 
Democracy achieves this goal by putting the local government under the direct pressure 
of citizens who vote. In contrast, under a hierarchical political system, the central 
government relies on its political authority to create incentive mechanisms. For example, 
the "Cadre Evaluation and Appointment System" is used by the Chinese central 
government to induce desirable economic outcomes (Huang, 2002; Mei, 2007). At the 
same time, fiscal decentralization provides market incentives to local governments by 
making them the residual claimant over local revenues (Montinola et al., 1995; Jin et al., 
2005). 
This paper examines a very distinctive mechanism of providing incentives. In China, 
awarding "city" status to existing counties is the dominant way of creating new urban 
administrative units. The creation of a large number of cities through so-called 
"county-to-city upgrading" has changed China’s basic administrative structure, making 
the Chinese city system unique. City status gives localities both political and fiscal 
benefits, thus providing the center with an effective tool to reward counties. I present 
evidence that the central government uses the creation of cities as part of the incentive 
system for local officials, which is very important for China’s successful reform 
(Zhuravskaya, 2000; Li and Zhou, 2005). 
By viewing county-to-city upgrading as an incentive mechanism, I cast the 
relationship between center and localities as that between principal and agents. However, 
it has been argued that the central-local relationship in China is much more like political 
bargaining (see Shirk, 1993). As local governments get more and more discretion through 
decentralization, they gradually accumulate bargaining power that is used to negotiate 
political benefits from the center. Bargaining differs from the incentive mechanism in 
that it is based on the assumption of much stronger local political power. Despite the 
great attention paid to the central-local relationship by both political scientists and 
economists, few studies have attempted to determine whether political bargaining or 
principal-agent incentive mechanisms occur. My paper fills this gap by differentiating 
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between these two mechanisms and providing evidence on the dominance of incentive 
mechanisms in China’s central-local relationships. 
Using a panel data set covering all counties in China during 1993-2004, I show that 
the formal minimum requirements for county-to-city upgrading are not enforced in 
practice. Instead, economic performance has played a critical role in upgrading. I provide 
strong and robust evidence on the relationship between a county’s growth rate and its 
probability of getting city status after controlling for requirements such as industrial 
output, urban population and fiscal strength. Moreover, I conduct a test to distinguish 
between the incentive mechanism and the bargaining mechanism. Using local 
extra-budgetary funds as an example of divergence between central and local interests, I 
find that city status helps the center to align local interests with national ones. This 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that upgrading is used as an incentive 
mechanism, instead of being the result of bargaining. 
This paper relates to the existing literature in three ways. First, it highlights the 
coexistence of fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China. This unique 
institutional setting is attracting growing interests among economists (Blanchard and 
Shleifer, 2001; Zhang, 2006; Zhuravskaya, 2007). While the role of fiscal 
decentralization in stimulating economic growth has been discussed extensively (see, e.g. 
Qian and Weingast, 1997; Qian and Roland, 1998; Zhang and Zou, 1998), some recent 
studies argue that the centralized power structure is also crucial in creating yardstick 
competition among local officials and constraining them from practicing local 
protectionism (Cai and Treisman, 2004; Li and Zhou, 2005; Bai et al., 2007). Blanchard 
and Shleifer (2001) explicitly point out the complementarities between the "carrot" of 
fiscal revenue sharing and the "stick" of political centralization. In this paper, upgrading 
is the result of centralized decision-making; at the same time, it gives local officials more 
discretion over revenue collection. Thus, it reflects both political centralization and fiscal 
decentralization. 
Second, since upgrading provides many benefits to local officials, it is a substitute 
for promotion. This paper thus relates to the literature on the career concerns and political 
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promotion of local officials.1 Treating local officials in a county as a whole, I examine 
the effect of economic performance on their chance of getting political rewards. Similar 
to Li and Zhou (2005), I find a strong effect of economic growth. In contrast, my results 
do not support Bo (2002), who claims that fiscal performance is more important.  
Third, the emergence of a large number of cities has attracted lots of attention both 
inside and outside China (see, e.g. Au and Henderson, 2006). Existing studies on this 
subject have largely ignored the political economic reasons behind city creation. This 
paper is the first to discuss its incentive role, thus shedding light on the urban economics 
and regional science literature.2
Two specific advantages of examining county-to-city upgrading bear highlighting. 
First, using county-level data gives many more observations than other studies that use 
provincial-level data, thus increasing the power of tests. Second, as a measure of rewards, 
upgrading suffers much less from omitted variable bias relative to the promotion of local 
officials, which is the focus of many other studies. The reason is that upgrading is very 
costly and irreversible, so that the decision is made in a very deliberate way (Wu, 2000). 
In fact, applications for upgrading are submitted to the Ministry of Civil Affairs through 
the provincial government, and the final decision is made directly by the State Council. 
Such a strict process is well beyond the influence of county leaders. In contrast, the 
promotion decision of local officials is made by the government at just one level higher 
so that the unobserved factors, such as personal relationships, could be relatively 
important. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
background of county-to-city upgrading. Section 3 lays out the model and hypotheses. 
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results. The last section concludes. 
2. Institutional background: county-to-city upgrading in China 
There are four local administrative levels in China: province, prefecture (diqu), 
                                                        
1 See Bo (2002, Chapter 1) for a literature review on the political mobility of Chinese local officials; see Besley and 
Case (1996) for theoretical and empirical evidence on how career concerns generate yardstick competition in a 
democratic situation. 
2 For a general discussion on the political economy of city formation, see Henderson and Becker (2000). 
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county and township. At each level, jurisdictions are classified either in a normal form, or 
in a form with the name "city" or "town".3 For example, a province and a City Directly 
under the Central Government (zhixiashi) are both at the provincial level; a prefecture 
and a prefecture-level city are both at the prefecture level; a county and a county-level 
city are both at the county level, a xiang and a town are both at the township level.4 In 
this paper, county-to-city upgrading refers to the reclassification of a county into a 
county-level city.5 From 1983 to 2001, 430 county-level cities were established, most of 
which were created through upgrading. Only 25 of them were created by separating out a 
relatively urbanized area from a county and setting up a new government. 
This unique way of creating cities through upgrading stands in contrast to the 
experience of most countries, where "city" and "county" fall into different administrative 
categories. Cities only govern urban centers where population is concentrated. Instead of 
reclassifying a whole county, a new city is normally created inside a county. Also, the 
decision is often made through a voting. For example, in the U.S., a new city could be 
created by adopting a home rule charter. While in Brazil, new municipalities are 
established through local voting. 
The administrative units created through upgrading are different from cities as we 
normally understand the term (Chan, 1997). During upgrading, the entire county, not just 
the town, is labeled "city". Thus, cities include not only the urban centers, but also large 
expanses of rural areas. For example, Eerguna is a county-level city in Inner Mongolia. It 
covers an area of 11,000 square miles, 2/3 of which is forest and another 1/6 is grassland. 
Its population density is about 7 persons per square mile, only 1/50 of the national 
average. Such a "rural" administrative unit was nonetheless awarded "city" status in 1994. 
The Economist (2007b) describes Sansha, a county-level city consisting mostly of water 
and desolate islands in the South China Sea, as "no more than a bizarre misnomer". The 
confusion caused by upgrading even leads to a lawsuit (see the story about "Huangshan" 
city in Chung and Lam, 2004). Overall, the magnitude of upgrading is very substantial. 
                                                        
3 For a detailed description of the Chinese city system, see Chung (1999). 
4 Here are examples of cities at different levels. Shanghai city is at the provincial level, Suzhou city (which attracts the 
largest amount of foreign investment among all cities) of Jiangsu province is at the prefecture level, Shunde city (where 
massive enterprise privatization took place) of Guangdong province is at the county level. 
5 Similarly, there is another type of upgrading, prefecture-to-city upgrading, during which the entire prefecture is 
labeled "city". From 1983 to 2001, more than 160 prefectures were upgraded to prefecture-level cities.  
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Since 1983, nearly 15 percent of counties have obtained city status. 
The official rule to regulate county-to-city upgrading first appeared in 1983, when 
cities had shown advantages in attracting investment and the demand for city status 
increased in the coastal provinces. Under some rough requirements proposed by the 
Ministry of Personnel and Ministry of Civil Affairs, nearly 100 cities got city status 
during 1983-1986. In 1986, the minimum requirements for city status were raised, but 
were still considered to be very low (Chung and Lam, 2004). The number of cities 
continued to rise and the central government further raised the requirements in 1993, 
setting different standards for counties with different population density. As more and 
more counties became enthusiastic about city status, the central government realized that 
urbanization cannot be achieved by just changing the title to "city". Instead, large-scale 
upgrading has exaggerated the actual urbanization level. It eventually stopped approving 
county-to-city upgrading in mid 1997, only allowing prefectures to be eligible to get city 
status. Until now, county-to-city upgrading has not been resumed.  
Table 1 summarizes the main minimum requirements on industrialization level, 
urbanization level and fiscal strength announced in 1993. One interesting thing to note is 
that counties with lower population density were given lower standards. This seems to 
imply that, in the mind of the central government, setting up cities does not follow the 
usual idea of urban agglomeration. 
Although getting city status does not change a county’s rank in the administrative 
hierarchy, its government certainly gains much more political power, which is the reason 
to use the term "upgrading". For example, the party secretaries of many county-level 
cities are able to enter the standing committee of the prefecture-level party committee and 
enjoy deputy-prefecture political rank. The administrative authority is also expanded in 
areas such as finance, trade and transportation (see Table 2). In Zhejiang and Hubei, there 
is experiment that placing the budget of county-level cities under the direct supervision of 
the provincial government, thus bypassing the prefecture level.6 Table 2 also lists other 
benefits associated with city status. Among them, the most prominent one is that cities 
obtain a huge amount of revenues from the conversion of land into non-farm usage (Ping, 
                                                        
6 This is called "line item under province", or Shengji Jihua Danlie. 
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2006). Moreover, these benefits are not only for the local officials (such as bigger 
government size and higher official rank), but for the whole county as well. For example, 
additional revenues and favorable policies usually result in more urban infrastructures 
and better public services.  
The political privilege mentioned above also brings the local government closer to 
higher-level governments, thus facilitating the supervision from above. As will be shown 
later, such supervision will make local governments less likely to defy the center when 
they have potential conflict with the center. However, these small costs are overshadowed 
by the political and fiscal benefits and we observe great enthusiasm for city status among 
counties in the mid 1990s.  
At the same time, upgrading is costly to the central government. For example, the 
expanded government size will increase salary expenses that are paid out of the central 
budget. In many upgrading cases, the central government needs to make subsidies to new 
cities for their infrastructure construction. Besides these fiscal burdens, inequality could 
also rise as a result of upgrading policy. Since counties that get upgraded are generally 
rich ones, the favorable policies and subsidies they receive after becoming cities are 
likely to increase regional disparity. In addition, no city has been downgraded to a county 
so far. Such irreversibility greatly increases the cost of upgrading if it is not desirable to 
the central government ex post.  
3. Hypotheses and empirical strategy 
In this section, I formalize my arguments about the incentive role of upgrading into 
three hypotheses. The first hypothesis relates to the non-enforcement of formal rules, the 
second states the importance of economic growth in determining upgrading. The third 
one is actually composed of two alternative hypotheses that correspond to the incentive 
mechanism and bargaining mechanism, respectively. I also present empirical methods 
used to test each hypothesis. 
3.1 Non-enforcement of the formal rules 
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As shown in section 2, the central government sets certain rules to regulate 
upgrading. A natural hypothesis is that the center wants to enforce these rules. However, 
many scholars (e.g., Liu and Wang, 2000; Chung and Lam, 2004) have observed that the 
official minimum requirements for upgrading are not enforced in practice: while eligible 
counties compete to get upgraded, some ineligible counties nevertheless received city 
status because of special treatment. Chung and Lam (2004, p. 953) even report that the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs "was not in a good position to verify the statistics supplied by 
the counties". Thus, the first hypothesis of this paper is: 
Hypothesis 1: The formal minimum requirements for upgrading are not enforced. 
The data allows me to directly check whether all counties that got an upgrade meet 
the requirements listed in Table 1. To formally test this hypothesis, I will use an empirical 
model (to be introduced in the next sub-section) to examine the importance of these 
requirements. More details will be discussed in section 5. 
3.2 Main hypothesis and the empirical model 
If those formal rules were not enforced, upgrading should not be just an instrument 
for urbanization. The central government must have other considerations when making 
decisions. That is, there exist some informal rules that were not explicitly written in 
policy documents, but nonetheless played an important role in the upgrading decision. It 
turns out that growth rate is such a critical factor. To give a brief preview of the 
importance of growth rate, Figure 1 displays the number of upgrading cases from 1981 to 
1997, as well as the corresponding yearly GDP growth rate. We can clearly observe 
several waves of upgrading around 1983, 1988 and 1993, which roughly correspond to 
the periods when China experienced high economic growth. Figure 1 suggests that high 
growth may generate high demand for upgrading, thus inspiring me to examine the 
correlation between growth rate and probability of upgrading at the county level. 
To test the positive effect of growth rate on the probability of upgrading, I need to 
control for other confounding factors that affect upgrading. Obviously, industrialization 
level, urbanization level and fiscal strength are important socio-economic factors since 
they were listed in the official documents. Thus, the main hypothesis of this paper is: 
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Hypothesis 2: Conditional on industrialization level, urbanization level and 
fiscal strength, the higher the growth rate, the more likely an upgrading would 
happen. 
To test this hypothesis, I view upgrading as a discrete choice problem faced by the 
central government and model it in the following way.7 For county i at year t, the central 
government could choose either to upgrade it or not. A latent value Yit* represents the 
difference of utility the center expects to achieve under upgrading and non-upgrading. Yit 
is a binary variable representing upgrading status. The approval decision is made 
according to: 
Yit= 1 (upgrading) if Yit* >0; Yit= 0 (non-upgrading) otherwise 
Here Yit* = f(Git, Zit, εit), in which Git represents growth rate, Zit is a vector that 
includes other county-specific variables such as industrial output, urban population and 
fiscal revenue. The error term εit contains unobserved factors in the decision-making 
process. 
Assume that f(Git, Zit, εit) has a linear form, so that Yit* =β0 + Gitβ1 + Zitβ2 + εit, and 
Pr (Yit= 1) = Pr (εit > -β0 - Gitβ1 - Zitβ2). Further assume εit follows a logistic distribution, 
I get the following logit model:  
(1) Pr (Yit=1) = Φ(β0 + Gitβ1 + Zitβ2) =exp(β0 + Gitβ1 + Zitβ2) / (1+ exp(β0 + Gitβ1 + Zitβ2)) 
3.3 Why growth matters? Two alternative hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that growth matters in getting city status. However, it does not 
tell us the specific mechanism through which growth plays a role. In fact, there are two 
possible interpretations of the positive effect of growth rate on upgrading. The obvious 
one is that the central government uses upgrading to reward counties with a high growth 
rate, which suggests that upgrading serves as an incentive mechanism. This interpretation 
casts the central-local relationship in a principal-agent framework. Since the central 
                                                        
7 If we assume that 1) all counties started to have a chance of upgrading since 1983, the beginning year of the policy, 
and 2) upgrading to city status is an ultimate outcome for most counties if time horizon is long enough, then upgrading 
could be alternatively treated as a duration problem. Getting city status means the ending of spells, and the probability 
of upgrading is the corresponding hazard. However, since I can only follow the subjects for 5 periods, it is very difficult 
to extract any meaningful information on the shape of the hazard of ending the spell. Thus, duration model is not 
adopted in this paper. 
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government (principal) cannot perfectly monitor the localities’ (agents) effort in 
economic development, it uses incentives to elicit good economic outcomes represented 
by a high growth rate. In contrast, some scholars have argued that the central-local 
relationship in China is much more like bargaining (e.g., Lampton, 1992; Shirk, 1993). 
Accordingly, upgrading could be viewed as a result of central-local bargaining. High 
levels of economic performance, approximated by a high growth rate, strengthen the 
bargaining power of the local government and provide it with greater leverage in getting 
an upgrade. This interpretation is also consistent with the result that a higher growth rate 
leads to a higher probability of upgrading. Thus I have the following competing 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3A (Incentive): The central government uses upgrading as a reward 
in an incentive mechanism. 
Hypothesis 3B (Bargaining): Upgrading is a result of political bargaining, in 
which a high growth rate strengthens the bargaining power of a county, and thus 
helps it to get city status. 
These two hypotheses display different pictures of China’s politics of governance. 
The incentive hypothesis assumes that the center has a tight control over local 
governments. The bargaining hypothesis, however, puts local officials in a more powerful 
position in playing political games with the center. Although local officials are appointed 
rather than elected, it does not mean that the local government is always weak. As the 
notorious saying tells, "Whenever there is a policy top-down, there is a strategy 
bottom-up (Shang you zhengce, xia you duice)." Sometimes non-cooperation is used as a 
strategy to confront the center. To some extent, the bargaining hypothesis suggests that 
the center is "forced" by local governments to give out the city recognition. When 
describing the administrative changes in the reform era, Chan (1997, p. 86) mentions 
"pressure from below for faster change and more thorough reform builds up". Chung and 
Lam (2004, p. 953), based on interviews with officials, claim that the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs "often found it difficult to resist political pressure from below" in approving 
upgrading applications. The non-enforcement of the official upgrading requirements 
further raises doubts on the central government’s capacity to enforce pre-announced 
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policies and gives some support to the bargaining argument. Besides, anecdotal evidence 
also suggests the existence of case-by-case negotiation in upgrading (Su, 2000). 
In fact, the bargaining hypothesis has a long tradition in the study of Chinese politics. 
Lampton (1992, p. 34) writes that "bargaining is one of the several forms of authority 
relationship in China. ... bargaining remains a key feature of the system [after 1989]." 
Naughton (1992) states that both the center and localities are equipped with bargaining 
power when specific policies of economic reform are being decided. Shirk (1993) studies 
the central-local relation from the perspective of accountability. Since the top leaders 
were elected by the Central Committee members, among whom provincial leaders form 
the largest bloc, she argues that central leaders have to compete for the support of 
provincial leaders, so that the bargaining position of the provinces is strengthened. These 
studies treat bargaining and mutual compromise as the working mechanism between the 
central and local governments, and form the background for my bargaining hypothesis. 
Mei (2006) uses a simple graph to highlight the difference between the 
principal-agent and the bargaining models based on their emphasis on local officials’ 
political power (Figure 2). By putting these two models together with models of full 
centralization and full decentralization, this graph clearly shows that the bargaining 
model ascribes more political power to the localities relative to the principal-agent model, 
while both models are not as extreme as full centralization or decentralization. 
Empirical literature on the bargaining mechanism is also fairly developed. For 
example, several studies have shown that the provincial representation in the Central 
Committee affects resource allocation across provinces (Sheng, 2005; Su and Yang, 2000; 
Huang, 2001). Maskin et al. (2000) further shows that the provincial representation 
depends on the power of a province composed by its population, economic size and fiscal 
contribution. Thus, this strand of literature is consistent with the bargaining hypothesis 
that economic performance strengthens local bargaining power. This paper goes one step 
further by directly comparing the bargaining mechanism with the principal-agent 
incentive mechanism. 
Since counties cannot negotiate directly with the central government due to their low 
position in the administrative hierarchy, bargaining takes place between governments at 
 10
adjacent hierarchical levels. For example, as the county government gains political 
privileges and administrative authority through upgrading, the prefecture government will 
necessarily lose some power. Therefore, to get the prefecture government’s support on its 
upgrading attempt, the county will have to negotiate with the prefecture. More 
importantly, since the application for upgrading is through the provincial government, 
there is central-local bargaining between the center and provinces. In fact, provincial 
governments, as representatives of their subordinate counties, have played an important 
role in competing for city status.8 The bargaining power of provincial governments will 
be partly determined by the economic performance of counties in candidacy.  
3.4 Incentive versus bargaining: empirical strategy 
In order to distinguish the two competing hypotheses, incentive versus bargaining, I 
examine the behavior of city and county governments in situations where the center and 
localities have divergent interests. The logic is as follows. 
According to the bargaining hypothesis, counties get upgraded because of their 
strong bargaining power. Since city status brings political privileges to local officials, 
local bargaining power should be strengthened through upgrading. Thus, when there is 
any divergence between central and local interests, city status makes localities more 
capable of pursuing local interests against the center. Moreover, the best time to do so is 
right after upgrading when local bargaining power would be at its strongest. Thus, we 
should see a larger divergence between central and local interests just after cities get 
upgraded. 
In contrast, the incentive hypothesis suggests that the center maintains control over 
localities, and it alone decides which counties get upgraded. City status facilitates 
administrative supervision, thus helping the center to better align local interests. This 
hypothesis predicts that cities are less likely to act against the central government. 
Moreover, the detailed evaluation process of upgrading is equivalent to performing ex 
ante monitoring over local governments, meaning that newly upgraded cities are least 
likely to make decisions that diverge from the center’s wishes.  
                                                        
8 Ren and Wang (1999) give an example showing that the provincial bureau of civil affairs is crucial in helping 
counties to get city status. 
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In sum, these two hypotheses have different predictions on how city status is going to 
affect the way local governments promote local interests at the cost of the central 
government. By comparing counties with cities, and furthermore, newly upgraded cities 
with old cities, I can test one hypothesis against the other.9 This requires me to have a 
proper measure of divergence between central and local interests. 
In China, the existence of local "extra-budgetary funds" (EBFs) as opposed to 
"within-budgetary fiscal revenue" provides a good example of the conflict between 
central and local interests. EBFs consist of all resources managed directly or indirectly by 
administrative branches of the government outside the normal budgetary process. EBFs 
are concentrated at the sub-national level and not subject to treasury management or 
budgetary oversight (Wong and Bird, 2005). In times of fiscal stress, local governments 
respond by introducing a large number of fees, charges, and revenues from land leasing, 
which are not shared with, and often not reported to, higher-level governments. Park et al. 
(1996) show that local governments have become very practiced in hiding income in 
extra-budgetary accounts, making it extremely difficult for the central government to 
monitor true deficits. Ping (2006) finds that increases in the administrative cost of local 
governments are due to EBFs, which softens the budget constraint of local governments.  
With these properties, EBFs could be regarded as a measure of local budgetary 
independence. It is in local governments’ interest to maintain or even increase the size of 
EBFs. In contrast, the central government would like to minimize EBFs relative to 
within-budgetary fiscal revenue in order to extend its control over local officials. In fact, 
the central government has tried hard to curb local extra-budgetary fiscal activities. 
Huang (1996, p. 47) has shown that "since 1986 the State Council has attempted to 
manage the extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures more centrally." In 1997, the 
central government ruled that as many as thirteen types of "local government funds" 
should be brought from extra-budget to within-budget, which shows the center wanted to 
impose supervision over EBFs. However, this rule failed to fundamentally change the 
ability of local government to control EBFs (Ping, 2006). The fight over EBFs is going 
                                                        
9 This method is consistent with Huang (1996, Chapters 6-8), who distinguishes between a bargaining hypothesis and a 
control hypothesis when studying the impact of local officials’ bureaucratic status on the way they handle the 
central-local investment conflicts. 
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on between the center and localities and it clearly reflects the conflict of central and local 
interests.  
Thus, the ratio of EBFs to within-budgetary fiscal revenue serves as a good proxy for 
the divergence of local interests from the center’s. If the bargaining mechanism 
dominates, I expect this ratio to be higher for cities than for counties. Among cities, 
newly upgraded ones should have a ratio higher than old ones. If the incentive 
mechanism dominates, the opposite should happen. The empirical model is: 
(2) Ratioit = β0 + Cityi * β1 + Newcityi * β2 + Zit * β3 + vt + εit  
where Ratioit is the ratio of EBFs to within-budgetary fiscal revenue for county i at year t. 
Cityi is a dummy for city status. Newcityi is a dummy for newly upgraded cities, whose 
definition will be discussed in section 5. Zit is a vector of control variables that include 
GDP, population and growth rate; vt is the year dummy; εit is the error term. While β1 is 
the effect of having city status, β2 is the additional effect of being newly upgraded 
conditional on having city status. The sign of the estimate of β1 tells us which mechanism 
dominates. Whether β2 has the same sign with β1 will provide a further check. In short, 
the prediction of the two competing hypotheses is: 
Incentive hypothesis: β1 < 0, β2 < 0 
Bargaining hypothesis: β1 > 0, β2 > 0 
4. Data 
Systematic data on Chinese jurisdictions below the provincial level is difficult to 
collect. While several papers have employed prefecture-level data to study the incentives 
of local officials (e.g., Li and Bachman, 1989; Landry, 2003), no one has ever used 
county-level data to do so. The difficulty is two-fold. On the one hand, statistics of 
counties are distributed in the statistical yearbooks of each province, making it hard to 
build a relatively complete data set. On the other hand, the traditional measure of rewards 
to local officials, promotion, is almost impossible to find for county-level officials. 
To overcome these difficulties, I use data from the yearly series of Sub-Provincial 
Public Finance Statistics, which is published by the Ministry of Finance. It covers all 
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county-level jurisdictions during 1993-2004 and includes detailed public finance 
information, as well as data on basic socio-economic conditions.10 I use upgrading to 
capture the political rewards to county leaders, substituting for the usual measure, 
promotion. The specific benefits associated with city status make upgrading a reliable 
measure of rewards. In contrast, the existing literature studying promotion often faces the 
problem of identifying when mobility is a true promotion and when it is not.11  
To estimate equation (1), I use data from 1993, the beginning year of the published 
data, to 1997, when upgrading stopped. For county-level cities, I drop observations in 
their post-upgrading period because there is no chance of downgrading or further 
upgrading available (see Table 3 for more details). Data of Xizang (Tibet) is dropped 
because it obviously faces a different policy on jurisdiction administration.  
The key independent variable is the growth rate of Gross Value of Industrial and 
Agricultural Output (GVIAO). Since GDP data is not available before 1998, GVIAO is 
the best consistent measure of a county’s total economic activity. Similar to Li and Zhou 
(2005), I use its growth rate to measure economic performance. As stated above, I control 
for industrialization level, urbanization level and fiscal strength since they are official 
requirements on upgrading. Measures for these requirements include industrial output 
value, share of industrial output value in GVIAO, urban population, share of urban 
population in total population and per capita (within-budgetary) fiscal revenue. 
Table 4 shows the comparison of mean values for upgrading and non-upgrading 
cases. A total of 99 upgrading cases are identified through official records from the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs.12 All the output and revenue measures have been adjusted to 
1993 constant prices using the yearly GDP deflator (growth rate is calculated using 
adjusted values). While growth rate of GVIAO starts from 1994, growth rate of fiscal 
revenue starts only from 1995. The reason is that the 1994 tax reform fundamentally 
changed local tax base and makes the growth rate of fiscal revenue from 1993 to 1994 
                                                        
10 Tsui (2005) and Zhang (2006) also use data from selected years of this series. 
11 Part of the reason is that the actual power and political benefits enjoyed by an official may be hard to discern using 
only his or her job title under the Chinese political system (Mei, 2006). For example, when a provincial governor is 
assigned to be the director of the provincial People’s Congress, this seemingly lateral move usually means loss of 
power and usually marks the end of his or her political career. While Li and Zhou (2005) attribute this kind of mobility 
into the same category as demotion, Bo (2002) simply drops such kind of observations from his study.  
12 Available online at http://www.xzqh.org. 
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meaningless. Except for these two growth rates, all other variables are averaged from 
1993 to 1997. From the p-values of t-tests of mean differences between upgrading and 
non-upgrading observations, it is clear to see that there are significant differences 
between these two groups.  
Figure 3 depicts the trend of growth rate for all cities that were upgraded from 
counties in recent years. The horizontal axis represents the number of years since 
upgrading. Both the actual growth rate and the growth rate relative to the national 
average are displayed. They show exactly the same trend. In the year when upgrading 
happens and the year right before upgrading, the average growth rate of these 
jurisdictions are at a high level; right after upgrading, it starts to drop; two years after 
upgrading, it falls below the national average. After that, the average growth rate returns 
to the national average and stays around there. The timing of high growth rates shown in 
this figure suggests that incentives may play an important role in generating high growth 
rates. 
In estimating equation (2), the ratio of local EBFs to within-budgetary fiscal revenue 
captures the divergence between local interests and those of the center. There is no direct 
report of EBFs at county level in my data set. However, various types of "local 
government funds" were reported since 1999. As I have shown in section 3, these funds 
were nominally brought from extra-budget into budget by the central government in 1997, 
but were still under the control of local governments (Ping, 2006; Wong and Bird, 2005). 
Thus, these "local government funds" could reflect the conflict between central and local 
interests. I use the sum of them as a proxy for EBFs, so that the actual dependent variable 
is the ratio of the sum of local government funds to within-budgetary fiscal revenue.  
Table 5 compares the mean values of key variables between counties and 
county-level cities. The sample is from 1999 to 2004 because local government funds are 
not available before 1999. Since upgrading has already been stopped in 1997, there is no 
change in city status in this period, and consequently, I cannot perform a 
difference-in-difference exercise. This also explains why Cityi and Newcityi do not vary 
across time in equation (2). In this period, GDP data is available, so I use it to substitute 
GVIAO as the measure of local development level. From the table, it is obvious to see 
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that cities, with a greater power on revenue collection, raise much more "local 
government funds" than counties in average. However, the raw mean of the ratio of local 
government funds to within-budgetary fiscal revenue is not very different between cities 
and counties. In the following section, I will compare cities with a certain group of 
counties that have similar properties to cities, as well as controlling for confounding 
variables in the regressions.  
5. Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical results. First, I estimate the logit model (equation 
1) to show that growth rate has a positive effect on a county’s probability of upgrading. 
The results are robust to alternative definitions of growth rate, as well as various 
specifications and estimation techniques. Then I use stylized facts and results from a 
formal test to show that upgrading requirements are not enforced. After that, I estimate 
equation 2 to test the incentive hypothesis against the bargaining hypothesis. 
5.1 The positive effect of growth rate on upgrading 
5.1.1 Baseline results 
To estimate the effect of growth rate conditional on industrialization level, 
urbanization level and fiscal strength, I closely follow those official requirements on 
upgrading and control for industrial output value, share of industrial output in gross 
output, urban population, share of urban population in total population, and per capita 
fiscal revenue in equation (1). All these control variables are lagged by one year. Since 
counties vary greatly in size, I apply a log transformation to these variables (except the 
two shares) to reduce the effect of outliers.  
Table 6 shows the results estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). 
Column 1 reports the baseline results, listing coefficients and robust standard errors 
clustered at the prefecture level. The key independent variable, growth rate of GVIAO, 
has a positive and significant coefficient. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 2: 
conditional on industrialization level, urbanization level and fiscal strength, a higher 
growth rate increases the probability of achieving city status.  
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Among the five control variables that measure the official requirements, only urban 
population and fiscal revenue per capita have positive and significant coefficients. While 
industrial output and its share in total output have positive and insignificant coefficients, 
share of urban population has a negative and insignificant coefficient. To further control 
for the variation of upgrading policy across years, which is common for all counties, I 
add year dummies (column 2). The only change to the estimates is that the coefficient on 
share of urban population becomes positive, but it remains insignificant. In column 3, I 
substitute year dummies with province dummies. This is equivalent to ask such a 
question: what makes a county stand out from its peers in the same province in 
competing for city status? The results are very similar to column 1. Then I control for 
both year and province fixed effects (column 4). There is little change to the estimates of 
control variables, except that industrial output becomes significant. In all these models, 
growth rate remains positive and significant.  
Since several provinces do not govern any county that was upgraded during the 
sample period, adding provincial dummies means dropping counties in these provinces 
from the estimation. To compare the size of coefficient between the baseline model and 
the one with year and province fixed effects, I estimate the baseline model again on the 
sample used in column 4. The results are shown in column 5. Overall, adding province 
and year dummies generate a larger coefficient on growth rate, which suggests that they 
may capture the effect of omitted variables. For example, if the upgrading policy is in 
favor of provinces with low growth potential, such a bias in policy would have a negative 
correlation with growth and a positive correlation with upgrading. Therefore, including 
province dummies eliminates the effect of this omitted variable and increases the 
coefficient on growth rate. In the following alternative specifications, I always report 
result both with and without fixed effects. 
To assess the economic magnitude of the effect of growth rate, I calculate the 
marginal effect. In column 4, the mean value of dPr(upgrading)/dG equals 0.01. This 
implies that when the annual growth rate increases, for example, from 16% (the average 
growth rate) to 26%, the probability of upgrading will increase by 0.001, which is about 
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7% of the average upgrading probability (0.015).13 For the control variables that are 
significant in column 4, I also calculate their mean marginal effect. The change in 
probability of upgrading if industrial output moves from the 25th percentile to the 75th 
percentile is 0.022, which is about 1.4 times the average upgrading probability. For urban 
population and fiscal revenue per capita, this value is 0.026 and 0.007, respectively. 
These values are in the reasonable ranges. 
5.1.2 Robustness checks 
To check the sensitivity of the baseline results, I adopt alternative definitions of 
growth rate, as well as using various specifications and techniques to estimate the model. 
Since upgrading decisions are made throughout a year, it is likely that the center 
refers to last year’s performance when making decisions, especially early in the year. To 
check whether the results are sensitive to different timing, I lag growth rate by one year 
and lag all other independent variables by two years. The results (Table 7, columns 1 and 
2) are generally similar to the baseline results shown in Table 6, with an even larger 
coefficient on growth rate. Thus, the results are robust to different timing of variables.  
By including all counties in the estimation, I implicitly assume that every county has 
a chance of upgrading and thus faces an incentive. However, some counties actually have 
very little chance of getting city status, so that the upgrading policy does not provide any 
incentive for them to increase growth rates. One group of these counties is the nationally 
designated poor counties. The official document explicitly states that these counties 
generally should not be considered for an upgrading. Thus, I drop these counties and 
re-estimate the baseline model (columns 3 and 4). The results are little different. 
Furthermore, I adopt alternative measures for growth rate. Chen et al. (2005) show 
that relative performance matters more than absolute performance in evaluating 
provincial officials. Following their method, I subtract the average growth rate of 
counties in the same prefecture from each county’s growth rate and generate an 
alternative growth measure – relative growth rate. Without controlling for fixed effects, 
the relative growth rate is positive but not significant (column 5); once province and year 
                                                        
13 This magnitude is comparable to the one estimated in Li and Zhou (2005). They show that if the GDP growth rate of 
a province increases by same amount (10 percentage points from mean), the probability of provincial leaders getting a 
promotion increases by an amount that is 24% of the average probability. 
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dummies are included, relative growth rate has a positive and significant coefficient, and 
the size is even larger (column 6). This suggests that relative growth rate is also used as a 
reference in the evaluation of counties’ economic performance.  
Following Li and Zhou (2005), I use average growth rate as another alternative 
growth measure, where the averaging is from the beginning of the sample to the current 
year. This measure corresponds to an evaluation process that is based on both the current 
and past growth rates. The results (columns 7 and 8) show that, although not statistically 
significant, the coefficient on average growth rate has a magnitude similar to the baseline 
results. These exercises show that the baseline results are not driven by a particular 
definition of growth rate. 
On the other hand, some studies have argued that the central government is most 
interested in seeing continuously growing fiscal revenues (e.g., Bo, 2000). So I put both 
the growth rate of fiscal revenue and the growth rate of gross output in the regression to 
see which growth rate is more important (Table 8, columns 1 and 2). To estimate this 
model, I only use data from 1995 to 1997 because the growth rate of fiscal revenue starts 
from 1995. The results show that the coefficient on growth rate of fiscal revenue is not 
significant either statistically or economically; whereas the growth rate of gross output 
remains to be significant. A plausible explanation is: local governments sometimes lower 
the actual tax rate to attract investment, so that the high economic growth rates are 
achieved at the cost of fiscal revenues. Thus, the growth rate of fiscal revenue is not used 
as an important performance indicator in practice. 
Since my sample covers several years, upgrading policy may vary during this period. 
Additionally, growth rates in different years may not be comparable to each other. For 
example, a growth rate of 14% is below average in 1994, but is above average in 1997. 
Controlling for year fixed effects could partly take care of this problem by allowing 
different intercepts for different years, but the marginal effect of growth rate may also 
change across time. Ideally, I should estimate the model year-by-year to check the 
robustness of the effect of the growth rate in different years. Due to the limited sample 
size and rareness of upgrading cases in some years, I split the sample into two periods: 
1994-1995 and 1996-1997. The estimation on these two sub-samples (columns 3-6) is 
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consistent with the baseline model. In addition, I estimate the model using a cross-section 
where each county counts as one observation. In this specification, the dependent variable 
equals one if the county gets upgraded during the sampling years, and the independent 
variables are the average values across these years. Although the small sample size 
generates larger standard errors, the results provide evidence on the positive effect of 
growth rate (columns 7 and 8). These tests demonstrate that, even though the upgrading 
policy may vary across time, growth rate always plays a crucial role. 
One caveat to my empirical model is sample attrition. Once a county gets city status, 
it loses the chance of receiving any further reward through upgrading, and its probability 
of having Yit= 1 is zero since then. Thus, in the discrete choice framework, 
post-upgrading observations are ruled out of the estimation (explained in Table 3). In this 
unbalanced panel, the attrition could be non-random if error terms have serial correlation 
across time. For example, if a county suffers a positive shock to the idiosyncratic error 
term in a specific year and gets upgraded, it is dropped out of the sample in subsequent 
years, during which the error term could continue to get positive shocks if there is a 
positive serial correlation. In this case, sample selection is correlated with the error term 
and could induce inconsistency of estimates. To correct for this problem, I adopt a probit 
model with sample selection (Van de Ven and Van Pragg, 1981). It is similar to the 
Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979), except that the dependent variable in the 
outcome equation is also binary. Following Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 17.7), I treat the 
probit of the previous year as the selection equation, where non-upgrading means being 
selected into current year’s outcome estimation. Specifically, a probit model of upgrading 
on growth rate and control variables using data of 1994-1996 serves as the selection 
equation, and the outcome equation is another probit using data of 1995-1997. By 
assuming a bivariate normal distribution of the error terms of these two equations, this 
model is estimated using MLE.14
The results are shown in Table 9. Column 1 shows the results of a usual probit 
                                                        
14 The probit model is very similar to equation 1, except that the error term ε is assumed to follow a normal distribution 
instead of a logistic distribution. In the selection equation, the dependent variable equals one in case of non-upgrading; 
in the outcome equation, the dependent variable equals one if upgrading happens. The reason I estimate a probit model 
with sample selection rather than a logit model with sample selection is computational convenience. The actual 
estimation is performed by Stata’s command "heckprob".  
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estimation. The coefficient on growth rate is almost significant (p-value is 0.12). The 
corresponding mean marginal effect (0.0044) is about the same as in a logit model 
(0.0042), which shows that the probit model is little different from the logit model. 
Column 2 shows the results of probit with sample selection. The estimates are very 
similar to column 1. Moreover, the correlation coefficient between error terms of the 
selection equation and outcome equation is not statistically significant, suggesting that 
sample selection is not a severe problem and it does not bias my estimates. 
In sum, various robustness tests provide strong and consistent evidence for 
hypothesis 2, which states that growth rate plays a crucial role in upgrading. 
5.2 Testing the non-enforcement of upgrading requirements 
5.2.1 Stylized facts 
To test the non-enforcement of formal minimum requirements for upgrading, I first 
use the data to check whether counties being upgraded during my sample period meet 
these requirements. Table 1 has listed the three main requirements, which are concerned 
with industrialization level, urbanization level and fiscal strength, respectively. Each 
requirement has an absolute criterion and a relative (or per capita) one. For counties with 
different population densities, these upgrading requirements are also different. Based on 
the 1993 data, I summarize the number and percentage of counties that meet each 
criterion, as well as those that meet both criteria of a specific requirement (Table 10).15 
This table shows that the requirement on urbanization level is quite stringent, while the 
requirement on fiscal strength is less binding. 
Based on the three requirements, I construct three dummy variables: industrialization 
dummy, urbanization dummy and fiscal dummy. Each dummy equals one if both criteria 
of the corresponding requirement are met. For example, for a county with a population 
density above 400 per square km, if its fiscal revenue exceeds 60 million RMB yuan and 
the per capita revenue exceeds 100 RMB yuan in a particular year, then its fiscal dummy 
                                                        
15 In the official requirements shown in Table 1, "urban population" refers to those who are engaged in non-agricultural 
production. There is no direct report of this variable in my data set. Instead, I have data on population with urban 
registration status. For each population density group, I also know the average ratio of population engaged in 
non-agricultural production to those with urban registration status. Therefore, I am able to get an estimate of population 
engaged in non-agricultural production for each county. I use this estimated urban population to tell whether a county 
meets the requirement on urbanization level. 
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equals one in this year; otherwise this dummy equals zero. I assign all county-year 
observations in 1994-1997 into different cells according to the value of these three 
dummies and whether there is an upgrading. The number of observations in each cell is 
listed in Table 11. To make it easy to read, I further combine cells with equal number of 
requirements been satisfied and summarize them in Table 12. Among the 99 cases of 
upgrading, only 6 meet all three requirements; 39 meet two, 30 meet only one, and 24 
meet none. On the other hand, there are 36 cases where all three requirements are met but 
the counties did not get upgraded. This table clearly demonstrates that the official 
requirements are not enforced in practice.  
5.2.2 Tests based on the logit model 
To formally test hypothesis 1, I extend equation (1) to allow for flexible functional 
form in the logit model. Bacially, I add the three dummies (industrialization dummy, 
urbanization dummy and fiscal dummy) and their interaction terms with corresponding 
variables into the model to check whether meeting one or several requirements increase 
the average probability of upgrading and the marginal effect of independent variables. 
Once these results are shown, it will be straightforward to draw the conclusion that the 
official requirements are not enforced. 
I first allow the marginal effect of three control variables (industrial output, urban 
population and fiscal revenue) to change once the corresponding requirement is met. To 
do this, the three dummies and their respective interactions with the three control 
variables are included in the model. While the coefficients on these dummies tell us 
whether the average probability of upgrading has a jump once a requirement is satisfied, 
the coefficients on the interaction terms would indicate whether meeting a requirement 
changes the marginal effect of the corresponding control variable. The results (Table 13, 
column 1) show that the only important requirement is fiscal strength. The coefficient on 
the fiscal dummy is 5.2, meaning that the average probability of upgrading will jump up 
by about four times of the average value once the fiscal requirement is satisfied. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative and its size is about the same as the 
coefficient on fiscal revenue per capita, suggesting that the marginal effect of fiscal 
revenue per capita entirely fades out once the fiscal strength requirement is satisfied.  
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I then allow observations that meet some requirement and those that fail to meet to 
have different intercepts and different marginal effects on growth rate. To do this, I create 
a dummy "Meet >=2 requirements", which equals one if at least two requirements listed 
in Table 1 are satisfied. I put this dummy and the interaction term with growth rate in the 
model (column 2). Another dummy "Meet >=1 requirement" is defined in a similar way, 
and the results are shown in column 3. In both columns, growth rate and the dummy are 
both positive and significant, while the interaction term is not statistically significant. 
This implies that satisfying some requirements increases average probability of upgrading, 
but does not change the marginal effect of growth rate. 
Finally, both growth rate and control variables are allowed to have flexible functional 
form (columns 4 and 5). The results are consistent with those displayed in columns 1-3. 
The only exception is that growth rate, "Meet >= 2 requirements" dummy and "Meet >= 
1 requirement" dummy become less significant. However, the size of their coefficients 
remains similar. 
These results are summarized in Figure 4. The upper-left diagram shows that meeting 
some requirements put the county in an advantageous situation to compete for city status 
(i.e., with a higher average probability); but it does not change the marginal effect of 
growth rate. The lower-right diagram shows that before meeting the fiscal requirement, 
an increase in fiscal revenue per capita would increase the probability of upgrading. Once 
meeting this requirement, the average probability of upgrading will jump up to a higher 
level, but additional increase in fiscal revenue would not matter any more. The other two 
diagrams show that industrialization requirement and urbanization requirement are not 
important. Overall, the fiscal requirement seems to be enforced more strictly than other 
two requirements, which seems to be consistent with the fact that there are more counties 
meet the fiscal requirement than those that meet the other two requirements.  
Since these requirements are supposed to be the "minimum" level for a county to be 
eligible for upgrading, it is reasonable to conclude that the official requirements on 
upgrading are not enforced in practice. Thus, upgrading is not just an instrument for 
urbanization. Whether it is a tool of rewarding or a result of center-local bargaining is the 
task of the next sub-section. 
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5.3 The incentive hypothesis versus the bargaining hypothesis 
To empirically distinguish the incentive hypothesis from the bargaining hypothesis, I 
examine the effect of city status on the divergence of local interests from those of the 
center, as measured by the ratio of the sum of local government funds to the 
within-budgetary fiscal revenue.  
As mentioned before, the central government stopped approving county-to-city 
upgrading in 1997. In fact, this change of policy was not publicly announced until 2000 
(Xin Changzheng, 2000), and counties still had an incentive to compete for city status in 
years immediately following 1997. This actually allows me to construct propensity scores 
for hypothetical upgrading probability in 1998 and 1999, which could help to control for 
differences between cities and counties. Specifically, I first estimate the baseline logit 
model using 1994-1997 data. Then I apply the estimated parameters to the 1998-1999 
data to construct propensity scores. Had the upgrading policy continued, propensity 
scores should represent the probability of getting city status predicted by their observed 
characteristics, and counties with high scores should have a fairly large chance to win 
city status. Thus, except for not having the city title, these counties are otherwise similar 
to cities, especially newly upgraded ones. I choose 85 counties with scores higher than 
0.1 in any of these two years to construct a restricted county sample.16 Based on observed 
characteristics, these counties are similar to cities, and the comparison between cities and 
this restricted county sample is more meaningful. Henceforth, I call these 85 counties as 
the "comparison group counties." 
Figure 5 draws the average ratio of the sum of local government funds to the 
within-budgetary fiscal revenue for these "comparison group counties," newly upgraded 
cities (upgraded during 1994-1997) and all cities, respectively. Obviously, these 
"comparison group counties" have a much higher ratio than cities, and the difference 
increases overtime.  
To estimate equation (2), I run OLS regressions using pooled data from 1999-2004. 
The control variables for county size and development level include log population, log 
                                                        
16 The reason to set the cutoff value at 0.1 is to make the number of these counties roughly equal to the number of 
newly upgraded cities. The results are robust to other cutoffs, such as 0.05 and 0.15. 
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GDP and growth rate of GDP. Since local government funds have a strong time trend, I 
also include year dummies. I first show the results without including the Newcity dummy. 
Column 1 of Table 14 reports the result on the full sample, which contains all counties 
and all county-level cities. In column 2, I restrict the sample to those "comparison group 
counties" plus all cities, and call this "restricted sample". I then add the Newcity dummy 
and run regressions on the full sample (column 3) and the restricted sample (column 4). I 
further restrict the sample to only cities and run a regression without the City dummy 
(column 5). This specification directly compares newly upgraded cities with old cities. I 
adopt three different alternative definitions for the Newcity dummy. In columns 3-5, 
newly upgraded cities are those that received city status between 1994 and 1997 (no 
upgrading happens after 1997). According to this definition, 99 cities are classified as 
newly upgraded; the remaining 231 cities are classified as "old" cities, which were 
upgraded between 1975 and 1993. The cutoff year for newly upgraded cities is moved to 
1992 in columns 6-8, and 1990 in columns 9-11.  
In columns 1 and 2, the City dummy has a negative and significant coefficient, which 
is consistent with the incentive hypothesis. In other columns, the coefficients on City and 
Newcity are all negative, and the F-tests show that they are jointly significant in most 
cases. Since newly upgraded cities are a subset of cities, it is no wonder that the inclusion 
of Newcity dummy reduces the significance of City dummy. The important thing about 
this specification is that, as stated in section 3, having a negative coefficient on both 
dummies provides additional evidence on the incentive hypothesis. The coefficient on 
City dummy is of bigger size in the restricted sample than in the full sample, and the 
significance level is also higher. Thus, results from the restricted sample give strong 
support to the incentive hypothesis. In sum, these results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that city status helps the center to align local interests with the center; 
conditional on being cities, a recent upgrading aligns local interests even closer.17
As shown before, cities generally have greater access to revenue collection than 
counties. For example, the huge amount of revenues associated with land conversion 
provides city governments with additional flexibility in generating EBFs. My results, 
                                                        
17 Huang (2002) discusses other tools that align local interests with the center. 
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however, show that city governments nonetheless gave up such power and maintain a low 
level of EBFs relative to within-budgetary revenues. This kind of behavior could only be 
explained by the incentive hypothesis, which tells that the center maintains control over 
localities, and city status further facilitates the center’s supervision.  
My results provide evidence that the Chinese central government still maintain a 
tight control over local officials. This raises a puzzle: if the center has enough authority, 
why does it fail to enforce those pre-announced upgrading requirements? The answer 
may lie in the experimental and flexible nature of China’s policies. During the whole 
reform era, many policies were first tried in one or several provinces and, after proving 
their effectiveness, were implemented to nationwide (Qian, 2000). Also, the actual 
implementation is often very flexible. As long as the underlying issue is not urgent (such 
as family planning and public safety), policies are not implemented with strong central 
pressure (Lin et al., 2005). In the example of county-to-city upgrading, the central 
government announces formal rules to regulate the intense competition at the beginning. 
Upon receiving a specific application, it mainly considers economic performance. Since 
upgrading serves as a rewarding tool, the center also faces the choice between upgrading 
the county and promoting its officials. The decision is likely to be affected by the number 
of vacant positions that could be used in promotion. Thus, the actual decision may well 
be inconsistent with those pre-announced requirements.  
6. Conclusion 
Although based on a very specific example, the creation of "cities" in China, this 
paper studies a question with very general economic interests: how to provide incentives 
to local governments? I find that economic growth plays an important role in determining 
whether a county was upgraded to a county-level city. I further provide evidence on an 
incentive mechanism, under which city status was used to reward local officials for high 
growth, and helps to align local interests with those of the center as well. The central 
themes of this paper reflect Fogel’s (2007, p. 10) observation: "the successful unfolding 
of autonomy requires a center strong enough to integrate national and local goals … and 
to provide rewards to those who advance it [the progress of reform]." However, one 
should be noted that upgrading only provides one-time incentive to localities and the 
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rewards are for their past economic performance. The fact that the average growth rate of 
new cities quickly returns to normal after upgrading reflects the lack of long-term effect. 
In fact, some scholars consider county-to-city upgrading as a policy failure (Liu and 
Wang, 2000; Chung and Lam, 2004). 
According to Au and Henderson (2006), a large fraction of cities in China are smaller 
than the optimal size. The non-enforcement of upgrading requirements has certainly 
contributed to this problem. My study suggests that cities are not a natural outcome of 
urban agglomeration in China. Instead, city status has been used as an incentive 
instrument to serve political purposes. Now it has been ten years since the stopping of 
county-to-city upgrading. There is a growing voice on reforming the current 
administrative system. A recent article on the China Youth Daily (2007) describes how 
eager the county-level jurisdictions are to obtain more administrative independence. This 
paper will facilitate an understanding of the current administrative system from a political 
economic perspective. 
I conclude this paper by providing one more insight. Comparing China with Russia, 
Zhuravskaya (2007) points out that "the necessary condition for administrative 
centralization without local democracy to discipline local governments … seems to be 
efficient growth objectives of central officials." This paper shows that the Chinese central 
government does have a strong growth objective, which has even been embedded in the 
policy of setting up cities. However, the emphasis on growth also makes local 
governments obsessed with growth rates and produces some unintended consequences, 
such as severe pollution (The Economist, 2007a).  
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Figure 1. Number of county-to-city upgrading cases and yearly GDP growth rate 
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Source: GDP - China Statistical Yearbook (2006); number of upgrading - Liu and Wang (2000). 
 
Figure 2. The spectrum of political models on China’s central-local relationship 
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Figure 3. Trend of growth rates before and after upgrading 
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Note: This graph shows the average growth rate for cities that were upgraded from counties during 
1985-1997. The horizontal axis represents the time difference between current year and the year of 
upgrading. Year "0" means the year of upgrading, year "-1" means one year before upgrading, year "1" 
means one year after upgrading, etc. The normalized growth rate is the actual growth rate minus the 
national average value in the corresponding year. 
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Figure 4. Graphical interpretation of results drawn from Table 13 
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Note: The upper-left diagram shows the relation between upgrading and growth rate. The other three 
diagrams show the relation between upgrading and industrial output, urban population and fiscal revenue, 
respectively. "Threshold" means the cutoff value in the official minimum requirements.  
 
Figure 5. Comparison of interest divergence: counties and cities 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
year
comparison group
counties
new cities
all cities
 
Note: The vertical axis is labeled by the ratio of the sum of local government funds to within-budgetary 
fiscal revenue, which measures the divergence of local interests from the center. The three lines represent 
the average value of this ratio for the three groups, respectively. The "comparison group counties" refer to 
counties that have a predicted probability of upgrading higher than 0.1 in 1998 or 1999. 
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Table 1. Minimum requirements for county-to-city upgrading 
Population density (person/km2) >400 100 - 400 <100 
Percentage of counties in this category 25% 45% 30% 
Industrial output value (yuan) 1.5 billion 1.2 billion 8 billion 
Industrialization 
level 
Share of industrial output value in 
gross value of industrial and 
agricultural output 
80% 70% 60% 
Size of urban population (engaged 
in non-agricultural production 150k 120k 100k Urbanization level Share of urban population in total 
population 30% 25% 20% 
Fiscal revenue (yuan) 60 million 50 million 40 millionFiscal strength Per capita fiscal revenue (yuan) 100 80 60 
Source: "The Report on Adjusting the Criteria for the Designation of New Cities." Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, 1993. Available in English in Zhang and Zhao (1998). 
 
 
Table 2. Benefits of being a city: an incomplete list 
Category Benefits Source 
Tax and fee Cities enjoy a higher urban construction tax (7% 
compared to 5% for counties); could collect the 
surcharges levied on the issuing of motorcycle 
registration. In Liaoning province, cities could get 
1 to 2 million additional subsidies each year after 
upgrading. 
Chung and Lam (2004)
Zhang and Zhao (1998)
Land-related Cities generally convert more land to non-farm 
use and retain larger share of revenue from land 
sale. 
Zhang (2006) 
Ping (2006) 
Favorable 
policy 
After achieving the status of "line item under 
province" (Shengji Jihua Danlie), cities could 
report directly to the provincial administration to 
ask for investment project 
Su (2000) 
Zhang and Zhao (1998)
Administrative 
power 
Cities have more authority on foreign trade and 
exchange management; gains authority over 
police recruitment and vehicle administration; 
could establish the branch of custom and large 
State-Owned banks; could approve projects with 
higher cap of investment. 
Chung and Lam (2004)
Du (1993) 
Government 
size 
Cities could establish more branches of 
government and have a larger size of government 
employees 
Ren and Wang (1999) 
Rank and 
salary 
Sometimes the bureaucratic rank and salary of 
officials are raised after upgrading. 
Liu (2005) 
Reputation Cities generally carry greater prestige and are 
more attractive to investors from outside. 
Gu (1997) 
Chung and Lam (2004)
Wang et al. (1998) 
Note: Given the volatility of Chinese policies, the benefits are continuously changing overtime, and 
benefits listed are not necessarily effective during the same period. 
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Table 3. Construction of the sample for the logit model 
Observation year 
(shaded observations are dropped) Type of jurisdiction Number 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Always a county, never upgraded 1,579 county county county county county
Upgraded to a city in 1997 4 county county county county city 
Upgraded to a city in 1996 23 county county county city city 
Upgraded to a city in 1995 19 county county city city city 
Upgraded to a city in 1994 53 county city city city city 
Already a city in 1993 231 city city city city city 
Note: To estimate equation (1), the sample is from 1993 to 1997 because upgrading was stopped after 
1997. Once a county gets city status, it loses the chance of receiving any further reward through 
upgrading. Therefore, in the discrete choice model, post-upgrading observations (in shaded cells) are 
excluded from the estimation. 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison of mean values: upgrading and non-upgrading cases 
(1993-1997) 
Non-upgrading Upgrading Variable 
Obs Mean Obs Mean 
mean 
difference 
test: 
p-value 
Gross value of industrial and agricultural 
output (GVIAO ,10,000 yuan) 
8,048 145,563 99 651,154 0.000
Per capita GVIAO (yuan) 8,048 3,220 99 8,896 0.000
Growth rate of GVIAO (1994-1997) 6,349 0.164 99 0.246 0.028
Industrial output value 8,048 97,858 99 558,708 0.000
Share of industrial output value in GVIAO 8,046 0.527 99 0.732 0.000
Population (10,000) 8,053 41.7 99 65.2 0.000
Urban population (10,000) 8,046 4.93 99 11.04 0.000
Share of urban population in total 
population 
8,046 0.138 99 0.198 0.000
Within-budgetary fiscal revenue (10,000 
yuan) 
8,053 4255 99 6,980 0.000
Growth rate of fiscal revenue (1995-1997) 4,753 0.185 46 0.168 0.22
Fiscal revenue per capita (yuan) 8,051 92.0 99 122 0.000
Number of public employees per 100 
people 
8,053 3.07 99 2.43 0.000
Note: All the output and revenue measures have been adjusted to 1993 constant prices using the yearly 
GDP deflator. Growth rate is calculated using adjusted values. 
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Table 5. Comparison of mean values: counties and county-level cities (1999-2004) 
County County-level city Variable 
Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Local government funds (10, 000 yuan) 8,683 613 1,857 2,614
Per capita local government funds (yuan) 8,683 15.1 1,855 35.6
Within-budgetary fiscal revenue (10, 000 yuan) 8,683 5,422 1,857 18,377
Ratio of local government funds to 
within-budgetary fiscal revenue 8,683 0.105 1,857 0.116
Population (10,000) 8,683 43.6 1,855 72.9
GDP (10, 000 yuan) 8,661 150,811 1,854 544,184
Note: All output and revenue variables are measured in 1993 constant prices. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Positive effect of growth rate on upgrading - baseline results 
Dependent variable: 1 = upgrade; 0 = no upgrade  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.473** 0.519** 0.546** 0.749*** 0.426* Growth rate of GVIAO 
(0.211) (0.261) (0.224) (0.275) (0.219) 
0.033 0.367 0.456 1.130*** 0.103 Log(industrial output) 
(0.257) (0.301) (0.282) (0.323) (0.267) 
1.934 1.322 2.028 0.950 1.903 Share of industrial 
output (1.267) (1.375) (1.345) (1.454)  (1.788) 
1.949*** 1.584*** 2.189*** 1.600*** 1.978*** Log(urban population) 
(0.369) (0.396) (0.404) (0.395) (0.367) 
-1.304 0.976 -1.374 2.251 -1.341 Share of urban 
population (1.864) (2.002) (2.334) (2.313) (1.317) 
1.097*** 0.650* 1.390*** 0.684** 1.360*** Log(fiscal revenue per 
capita) (0.272) (0.352) (0.276) (0.332) (0.244) 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  
Province Dummies   Yes Yes  
Sample size 6,436 6,436 5,649 5,649 5,649 
Note: Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are listed. 
Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***. Except for growth rate 
and year dummies, all other independent variables are lagged by one year. 
 
 
Table 7. Positive effect of growth rate on upgrading – robustness checks 
Dependent variable: 1 = upgrade; 0 = no upgrade 
Lagged timing Exclude poor 
counties 
Relative growth rate Average growth rate 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.790** 1.107** 0.448** 0.739*** 0.326 0.814** 0.609 0.663 Growth rate of 
GVIAO (0.362) (0.470) (0.207) (0.282) (0.379) (0.392) (0.405) (0.438) 
0.313 1.191** -0.060 1.011*** -0.019 1.06*** -0.043 0.98*** Log(industrial output)
(0.388) (0.482) (0.262) (0.337) (0.255) (0.315) (0.251) (0.317) 
0.099 1.514 2.027* 1.169 -1.620 1.903 2.145* 1.617 Share of industrial 
output (1.736) (2.158) (1.212) (1.488) (1.831) (2.259) (1.217) (1.421) 
1.572*** 1.679** 1.965*** 1.618*** 2.01*** 1.66*** 2.04*** 1.73*** Log(urban 
population) (0.495) (0.664) (0.370) (0.400) (0.369) (0.395) (0.369) (0.400) 
0.700 -0.468 -1.889 1.579 2.103* 1.121 -1.689 1.332 Share of urban 
population (2.117) (2.741) (1.975) (2.390) (1.256) (1.429) (1.858) (2.314) 
1.076*** 1.574*** 1.041*** 0.625* 1.12*** 0.732** 1.13*** 0.752** Log(fiscal revenue 
per capita) (0.299) (0.444) (0.269) (0.335) (0.272) (0.331) (0.271) (0.335) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample size 4,754 3,904 4288 3885 6,436 5,649 6,441 5,654 
Note: Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are listed. Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are 
represented by *, ** and ***. In columns 1 and 2, growth rate is lagged by one year, all independent variables, except for year 
dummies, are lagged by two years. 
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Dependent variable: 1 = upgrade; 0 = no upgrade 
With growth rate of 
fiscal revenue 
Split sample:  
1994-1995 
Split sample: 
1996-1997 
Average value for all 
variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.642** 0.718* 0.343 0.592* 0.659* 0.686* 1.27* 0.967 Growth rate of GVIAO
(0.348) (0.441) (0.297) (0.345) (0.390) (0.401) (0.696) (0.884) 
0.023 0.206       Growth rate of fiscal 
revenue (0.802) (0.851)       
0.602* 1.32*** 0.177 1.128*** 0.176 1.272** -0.541 -0.276 Log(industrial output) 
(0.354) (0.469) (0.312) (0.382) (0.528) (0.591) (0.396) (0.474) 
1.52 0.777 1.844 1.451 1.531 -0.704 3.00* 2.50 Share of industrial 
output (1.87) (1.99) (1.731) (1.770) (2.521) (2.524) (1.78) (2.03) 
1.60*** 1.60** 1.978*** 1.648*** 1.376** 1.739** 2.92*** 3.58*** Log(urban population) 
(0.563) (0.628) (0.459) (0.481) (0.554) (0.722) (0.546) (0.598) 
0.952 1.07* -1.527 1.518 1.985 6.517* -6.76*** -8.01*** Share of urban 
population (2.39) (0.561) (2.811) (3.209) (2.865) (3.470) (3.02) (3.57) 
0.861* 1.15** 0.919*** 0.340 0.767 1.348** 2.55*** 3.65*** Log(fiscal revenue per 
capita) (0.524) (0.513) (0.264) (0.444) (0.488) (0.575) (0.512) (0.487) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Province dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample size 4785 3931 3266 2699 3170 2511 1685 1486 
Note: Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are listed. Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are 
represented by *, ** and ***. In columns 7 and 8, the independent variables are the average values during 1994-1997 (or from 
1994 to the upgrading year if upgrading happens). 
Table 8. Positive effect of growth rate on upgrading – robustness checks (continued) 
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Table 9. Correction for attrition – probit model with sample selection 
Dependent variable: 1 = upgrade; 0 = no upgrade 
Probit  Probit with sample selection  
(1) (2) 
0.23 0.23 Growth rate of GVIAO 
(0.15) (0.15) 
0.097 0.096 Log(industrial output) 
(0.16) (0.16) 
0.33 0.31 Share of industrial output 
(0.74) (0.73) 
0.68*** 0.65*** Log(urban population) 
(0.21) (0.19) 
0.12 0.17 Share of urban population 
(0.99) (0.97) 
0.51*** 0.48*** Log(fiscal revenue per capita) 
(0.18) (0.16) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
 0.23 Correlation coefficient between 
error terms in selection equation 
and outcome equation 
 (0.46) 
Sample size 4910 4910 
Note: Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are listed. 
Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***. Column 1 is 
estimated using data of 1995-1997. In column 2, selection equation is estimated using data of 
1994-1996; outcome equation is estimated using data of 1995-1997. 
 
 38
Table 10. Number of counties that satisfied each upgrading requirement in 1993 
Number of counties (total is 1,678) Requirement Criterion for this 
requirement Meet one criterion Meet both 
Industrial output 329 (19.6%) Industrialization 
level Share of industrial output 290 (17.3%) 158 (9.4%) 
Urban population 212 (12.6%) Urbanization level Share of urban population 212 (12.6%) 67 (4.0%) 
Fiscal revenue 444 (26.5%) Fiscal strength Per capita revenue 976 (58.2%) 352 (21.0%) 
Note: See Table 1 for the threshold value of each criterion. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Number of county-year observations by upgrading status and 
requirements satisfied (1994-1997) 
Urbanization dummy=0 Urbanization dummy=1  
Industry 
dummy=0 
Industry 
dummy=1 
Industry 
dummy=0 
Industry 
dummy=1 
Fiscal 
dummy=0 
4583 212 96 5 Non- 
upgrading 
cases Fiscal dummy=1 
1005 375 83 36 
Fiscal 
dummy=0 
24 14 2 0 
Upgrading 
cases Fiscal 
dummy=1 
14 31 8 6 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Number of county-year observations by upgrading status and 
number of requirements satisfied (1994-1997) 
Number of requirements satisfied total 0 1 2 3 
Non-upgrading cases 6,395 4,583 1,313 463 36 
Upgrading cases 99 24 30 39 6 
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Table 13. Non-enforcement of upgrading requirements – allowing for flexible 
intercept and marginal effect 
Dependent variable: 1 = upgrade; 0 = no upgrade  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.731** 0.668* 0.799** 0.643 0.740* Growth rate of GVIAO 
(0.289) (0.376) (0.358) (0.392) (0.378) 
 0.722**  0.577  Meet ≥ 2 requirements 
 (0.365)  (0.377)  
  0.789**  0.636 Meet ≥ 1 requirement 
  (0.370)  (0.416) 
 0.025 -0.181 0.093 -0.101 Interaction term 
 (0.591) (0.490) (0.580) (0.511) 
0.917** 1.052*** 1.033*** 0.882** 0.831** Log(industrial output) 
(0.386) (0.327) (0.322) (0.383) (0.381) 
-0.566   -0.784 -1.766 industrialization dummy 
(4.824)   (4.862) (4.799) 
0.114   0.116 0.201 Interaction term  
(0.390)   (0.392) (0.387) 
1.715*** 1.541*** 1.569*** 1.705*** 1.726*** Log(urban population) 
(0.457) (0.407) (0.396) (0.463) (0.452) 
0.131   0.374 0.043 Urbanization dummy 
(2.117)   (2.053) (2.136) 
-0.334   -0.467 -0.333 Interaction term 
(0.790)   (0.769) (0.794) 
1.088** 0.465 0.469 1.003** 1.003** Log(fiscal revenue per 
capita) (0.449) (0.380) (0.346) (0.470) (0.461) 
5.223**   5.484*** 5.090** Fiscal dummy 
(2.056)   (2.119) (2.109) 
-1.039**   -1.113** -1.040** Interaction term 
(0.432)   (0.448) (0.444) 
0.190 0.761 0.753 0.232 0.179 Share of industrial output 
(1.404) (1.446) (1.501) (1.385) (1.440) 
3.608 2.087 2.173 3.589 3.528 Share of urban population 
(2.545) (2.351) (2.351) (2.536) (2.576) 
Sample size 5649 5649 5649 5649 5649 
Note: All columns include year and province dummies. Coefficients and robust standard errors 
clustered at the prefecture level are listed. Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are 
represented by *, ** and ***. Except for growth rate, requirement dummy and their interaction 
term, all other independent variables are lagged by one year. 
 
 Table 14. Incentive versus bargaining- results 
Dependent variable: ratio of the sum of local government funds to within-budgetary fiscal revenue 
 "Newcity" = 1 if upgrade after 
1994 
"Newcity" = 1 if upgrade after 
1992 
"Newcity" = 1 if upgrade after 
1990 
 
(1)  
full 
sample 
(2)  
restricted 
sample 
(3)  
full 
sample 
(4)  
restricted 
sample 
(5)  
city 
sample
(6)  
full  
sample 
(7) 
restricted 
sample 
(8)  
city 
sample
(9)  
full 
sample 
(10) 
restricted 
sample 
(11)  
city 
sample 
-0.013* -0.047** -0.012 -0.047**  -0.006 -0.040*  -0.002 -0.036  City 
(0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.022)  (0.008) (0.023)  (0.009) (0.023)  
  -0.004 -0.0002 -0.002 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.020* -0.019 -0.020* Newcity 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
0.021*** 0.023** 0.021*** 0.023** 0.025** 0.021*** 0.022* 0.024** 0.021*** 0.023* 0.025** Log(GDP) 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) 
-0.011 -0.005 -0.011 -0.005 -0.008 -0.011 -0.004 -0.008 -0.011 -0.003 -0.007 Log(population) 
(0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) 
-0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 -0.015 Growth rate of GDP 
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) 
Joint F-test on "City" 
and "Newcity": p-value   0.14 0.11  0.04 0.03  0.03 0.02  
R-squared 0.08 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.19 0.18 
Sample size 10,269 2,098 10,269 2,098 1,823 10,269 2,098 1,823 10,269 2,098 1,823 
Note: All columns include a full set of year dummies. Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are listed. Significance levels of 10%, 5% 
and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***. Full sample include all counties and county-level cities; restricted sample include all cities and "comparison group counties"; 
city sample only include cities. 
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